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Summary
Risky decisions based on the combination of different sources of information
(e.g., decisions from description-plus-experience) have mostly been ignored, as
research has focused on examining each source separately. Across three experiments,
we explore the intricate relationship between experience and description by manipu-
lating when descriptive information about risky options is made available during an
experience-based task. The results show that the amount of prior experience moder-
ates the way that descriptive information is considered and integrated in the
decision-making process: Descriptions affected behavior more when participants had
little experience with the task, whereas their effect was less pronounced with
extended experience. This relationship reversed when participants had access to
foregone payoffs, with descriptions being considered more when participants had
more time to interact with the task. Potential mechanisms and theoretical accounts
are discussed with an emphasis on how the results and conclusions of the present
work can be applied to the effective design of warning labels.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Recent research in decision making under risk (e.g., choosing between
monetary gambles) has dedicated considerable attention to differ-
ences in behavior observed when comparing decisions based on
descriptions against decisions based on experience (Camilleri &
Newell, 2013; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010). When
making decisions from descriptions, individuals rely on complete
verbal descriptions of the outcomes and associated probabilities of
the choices available to them. These descriptions are typically
provided in writing, for example, the following descriptive risky
gamble from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was given to participants:
“Which of the following would you prefer? (A) 50% chance to win
1,000, 50% chance to win nothing; or (B) 450 for sure” (p. 264). Such
complete sets of unambiguous descriptions are rarely available in
real life. In contrast, in decisions from experience, individuals must
learn about each option's outcomes and their associated probabilities
experientially, by observing the outcomes and their frequencies
(i.e., probabilities) sequentially. Decisions from description can there-
fore be fully informed from the outset; whereas decisions from expe-
rience typically start as random choices which stabilize as information
accumulates, because participants begin the task with no information
and must learn as the task progresses.
1.1 | Combining description with experience
Despite extensive research comparing choice patterns between
decisions from description against decisions from experience (for a
comprehensive review, see Wulff et al., 2017), limited attention has
been given to decisions based on the combination of descriptions
and experience within the same decision environment. These
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situations are ubiquitous in every day life, as we frequently make
decisions relying on both descriptions and experience, such as doc-
tors who rely on both their own personal experience and reports
from academic journals when choosing between treatments. The
majority of this “description-plus-experience” literature has looked
at the interaction between the two sources of information when
both are always available (e.g., Jessup et al., 2008; Plonsky &
Teodorescu, 2020; Rakow & Miler, 2009; Yechiam et al., 2005).
Cognitive modelling analysis of description-plus-experience tasks
has shown that the observed behavior can be adequately described
by models based on experience alone (Erev et al., 2017; Lejarraga &
Gonzalez, 2011), unless descriptions provide novel useful informa-
tion which cannot easily be inferred from feedback—thus requiring
the incorporation of descriptions into the model (Weiss-Cohen
et al., 2016, 2018). However, in all the previous description-plus-
experience research, descriptions were present from the beginning
of the task, and before experiential feedback is provided, influenc-
ing behavior from the first selection (see also Ben-Asher et al.,
2013). When feedback was received in subsequent decisions
(i.e., via experience), participants had already been informed by
descriptions. Therefore, the extant research in description-plus-
experience has mostly investigated the behavioral influence of
experiences posterior to the influence of descriptions. This might be
a common situation, as we are often asked to make decisions
under risk where we are exposed to descriptive information before
gathering any experience from our choices, such as reading instruc-
tions manuals before using a new device, reading reviews before
going to a new restaurant, or reading the patient information leaf-
let before taking a new medication.
The reversed situation should not be overlooked, when prior
experience is accumulated before any descriptive information is
received. Individuals will often engage in risky behavior, such as riding
a bicycle without a helmet or crossing the road without due attention,
before seeing a government campaign describing the dangers of road
accidents. Commuters have been hurriedly running in stations around
the world and might one day stumble upon a poster describing the
dangers associated with running down the stairs. These descriptions
about risks can come in the form of warnings: Labels and signs which
can be considered as descriptions of otherwise rarely experienced
events with catastrophic consequences. Descriptive warnings are
often used in an attempt to influence behavior and are typically com-
bined with contradictory personal experiences. For example, “danger -
no diving” signs newly placed in the shallow end of a pool will be seen
by individuals with and without prior diving experience Goldhaber
and DeTurck (1989). Both novice and experienced workers might
come across new warning signs in a factory floor requiring the usage
of personal protective gear. Other notable historical examples include
drinking alcohol and smoking before legislation mandating the place-
ment of risk warning labels on bottles and packaging, and driving
experience before being exposed to safety belt usage promotional
campaigns. Crucially, the amount of prior experience before encoun-
tering such descriptions and warnings can vary widely in similar situa-
tions: Some individuals might have been engaging in risky behavior
long before reading a description of the risks for the first time,
whereas others might see them earlier.
The literature on warnings includes prior experience as a potential
moderating factor of their effectiveness (Laughery, 2006; Laughery &
Wogalter, 2006; Rogers et al., 2000). Newall and Parker (2019)
showed how more financially literate investors, who therefore have
more prior experience with financial markets, were less likely to be
influenced by descriptive warnings about investment choices. Wulff
et al. (2017) suggested that the influence of warnings on future
behavior is likely to depend on people's past and recent experience.
Similarly, Hertwig et al. (2018) proposed that rich experience may dis-
count the effect of a warning.
In a description-plus-experience task, Barron et al. (2008) investi-
gated the influence of prior experience on the risk-reducing impact of
descriptive warnings. Participants were presented with descriptive
information about the choice options either at the beginning of the
task (no prior experience), or halfway through the task (prior experi-
ence). Participants were asked to choose repeatedly between two
options, one lower-value sure alternative with guaranteed outcomes,
and one risky alternative which returned either a higher-value fre-
quent outcome (99.99% of the time) or a very rare (0.01%) negative
event which led to catastrophic losses (as in most warning labels in
everyday life, e.g., wearing safety goggles to protect your eyes from
the very unlikely event of flying debris). These descriptive warnings
had the desired effect of reducing selections of the risky choice; how-
ever, their effect was strongest for participants without prior experi-
ence and more subdued for participants who had prior experience (for
similar findings in medical decision making, see also Miron-Shatz et al.,
2010). Crucially, descriptions were framed as warnings, mentioning
only the risky part of the options (i.e., the rare losses), instead of a full
description of outcomes. The results showed that warning labels had
a stronger impact on behavior when presented earlier, before any per-
sonal experience; the impact of warning labels on behavior appeared
to be discounted when these were presented later, after personal
experience had been accumulated.
1.2 | Discounted descriptions
The idea that descriptions can be discounted in the presence of expe-
rience, when the two are presented concurrently, has been suggested
by Lejarraga (2010). According to the author, experience is preferred
over description because the former is more natural to process,
whereas the latter requires more costly cognitive effort—as a result,
experience can outweigh descriptions when both are available (see
also Hertwig et al., 2018). Previously, we have empirically demon-
strated how descriptions and experience are combined in the
decision-making process, with different weights allocated to each
source of information (Weiss-Cohen et al., 2016, 2018). We proposed
that the weights allocated to descriptions can be moderated by a
number of factors, two of which we have explored so far: the plausi-
bility of the descriptions in the face of experiential evidence (Weiss-
Cohen et al., 2016), and the complexity of the task (Weiss-Cohen
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et al., 2018). We believe that prior experience can be another modera-
tor for the discounting of descriptions, which could explain the behav-
ior observed by Barron et al. (2008): The more prior experience (and
information) an individual has accumulated, the lower the impact of
descriptions that are presented later.
Theories of reinforcement learning (RL) allow for the diminishing
impact of information over time and support the discounting of del-
ayed descriptions. In RL models, learning rates govern how much new
information is incorporated in previously learned beliefs (Sutton &
Barto, 1998). In models with decreasing learning rates, information
which is received later in the task has a smaller effect on learning than
information received earlier (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). Decreas-
ing learning rates are commonly observed in most learned behavior,
as it is a compromise between having fixed low or fixed high learning
rates (Murata et al., 2002). High learning rates are useful when
encountering new environments, such as the beginning of a task,
when quick learning is desirable (Doya, 2002; Konstantinidis et al.,
2015). However, high learning rates translate into new information
easily overwriting old information and very volatile behavior which
never stabilizes (Yechiam & Rakow, 2012). Lower learning rates can
smooth out learning and ensure that old knowledge is preserved,
thereby helping stabilize behavior, but they can slow down the learn-
ing process (Cohen et al., 2007). Therefore, a learning rate that starts
high but reduces over time allows for quick, accurate, and efficient
learning in static environments (Doya, 2002; Rakow & Miler, 2009).1
This is also in line with our prediction that late-presented descriptions
will be discounted in comparison to early-presented descriptions.
Bayesian theories of learning and information integration can also
explain the diminishing effect of description. Bayesian agents update
prior beliefs with new information to generate posterior beliefs.
Stronger priors, supported by extensive information (e.g., more prior
experience), are associated with lower uncertainty and are hardly
influenced by new observed data; weak priors, supported by limited
information, are more uncertain and will easily be influenced by new
information (Griffiths et al., 2008). More prior experience can thus be
associated with stronger prior beliefs. New information should influ-
ence Bayesian agents more strongly when they have limited prior
experience and weaker priors. As in reinforcement learning, such
processes are useful for smoothing out the learning process, reducing
volatility over time (Griffiths et al., 2008). This has been confirmed
with cognitive models that show that most learning happens when
uncertainty is highest, such as the beginning of tasks or when
encountering new scenarios (Dayan & Niv, 2008; Speekenbrink &
Konstantinidis, 2015).
Another behavioral phenomenon which can interfere in the learn-
ing process is the hot stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001).2 The hot
stove effect states that bad outcomes reduce the attractiveness of an
option, causing those options to be avoided (Biele et al., 2009). By
avoiding an option after a bad outcome has occurred, the ability to
collect more information about that option is severely constrained, as
feedback from that option will no longer be observed. With no new
information beeing collected, the bad outcome observed will remain
the most recent (and most salient) observation associated with that
alternative, decreasing its perceived value. As a result, this avoidance
behavior can create an imbalance between good and bad outcomes,
with the latter having stronger and longer lasting impacts on learning
than the former. The earlier the bad outcomes are observed (and this
avoidance begins), the stronger is the hot stove effect. Similar results
have been reported in other purely experiential tasks where bad out-
comes occur early in the course of a task. For instance, Fellows and
Farah (2005) have shown that losses in the first few choices can have
a greater, longer-lasting impact in risk avoidance than later losses (see
also Huber et al., 2011). By extension, we can expect early descrip-
tions (containing negative information) to trigger a stronger hot stove
effect than late descriptions. This effect however only presents itself
in tasks with partial-feedback (in which only the outcome from the
selected option is provided after every trial): If full-feedback is avail-
able (in which outcomes for all options are given after every trial), the
ability to accumulate information is not impacted, as individuals can
still gather information from their foregone alternatives. Full-feedback
can correct the biases introduced by bad outcomes, eliminating the
hot stove effect (Luria et al., 2017; Plonsky & Erev, 2017).
1.3 | Overview of experiments
Reinforcement learning and Bayesian updating can explain the dis-
counting of descriptions observed by Barron et al. (2008) in the pres-
ence of prior experience. However, in their study, participants in the
prior experience condition went through half of the task (50 trials)
before being presented with descriptions, which was a binary experi-
mental manipulation (i.e., no experience vs. prior experience). To the
best of our knowledge, no empirical research has explored how differ-
ent amounts of prior experience influence the impact of descriptive
warnings on risk-taking behavior. Understanding how prior experience
interacts with descriptions can help create better and more efficient
risk communication and warnings.
In this paper, we seek to determine whether different amounts of
prior experience can influence the level of discounting of descriptions,
with participants being exposed to different amounts of prior experi-
ence before descriptions are shown. In three experiments, we control
for the amount of prior experience before descriptions are revealed
and availability of outcome feedback (partial or full-feedback proce-
dure). We employ variations of a popular decisions-from-experience
paradigm, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994;
Steingroever et al., 2013), with the addition of descriptions. While
descriptions have been added before to the IGT (Weiss-Cohen et al.,
2018), our novel manipulation includes the introduction of descrip-
tions at different points during the task, after participants have had
the opportunity to accumulate different amounts of prior experience.
We predict that the impact of descriptions will be highest when there
is no prior experience, replicating the results in Barron et al. (2008). In
addition, we expect the amount of prior experience to moderate the
1Similar behavioral effects can be observed with different implementations of RL models,
such as a trial-dependent softmax choice rule with increasing exploitative behavior (see
Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in this direction.
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impact of descriptions on behavior. Descriptions that appear later,
when participants have already had a large amount of prior experience
with the task, should not influence behavior as strongly as descrip-
tions that appear early. If descriptions provide useful information that
can help participants perform better on the task, such as in the form
of warnings about risks to be avoided, then early presentation of
descriptions should help improve performance more than later ones.
We also compare paradigms with full feedback and partial feedback,
to explore if the relationship between prior experience and descrip-
tions is influenced by the presence of foregone payoffs, via the hot
stove effect. If it is, we expect the effect of prior experience to be
strongest when partial feedback is given.
2 | EXPERIMENT 1
This first experiment is based on a simple alteration to the IGT. In the
IGT, participants are asked to make decisions based on feedback
alone, without any descriptions. We altered the traditional paradigm
by introducing full descriptions to the task, providing participants with
information both via experience and via descriptions (Weiss-Cohen
et al., 2018). Descriptions were presented at different points during
the task, to allow for the accumulation of different levels of prior
experience. Consequently, such a manipulation can test our hypothe-
sis about how different levels of prior experience moderate the
impact of descriptions on behavior.
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants
We recruited 195 participants (108 females; age: M = 35.5 years)
online using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service.3 Participation was
restricted to individuals whose location was defined as in the United
States. No participants were excluded. Participants were paid a fixed
amount of US$0.20 for participating and an additional bonus
according to the outcomes of the choices they made during the exper-
iment (Bonus: M = US$0.24, SD = US$0.14, range = [US$0, US$0.56]).
Only positive bonuses were paid: 12 participants ended the task with
negative bonuses which were not deducted from their final
compensation.4
2.1.2 | Design
Experiment 1 was a between-subjects design with six experimental
conditions manipulating when descriptions were presented to partic-
ipants: one experience-only condition, in which descriptions were
not presented at all and participants learned the outcomes of their
choices through experience only (E: N = 33); one description-
before-experience condition, with descriptions available from the
first trial, prior to any accumulation of experiential knowledge about
the available options (DE: N = 33); and four experience-before-
description conditions, with descriptions appearing at different
points during the task (ED20: N = 34; ED40: N = 33; ED60: N = 33;
and ED80: N = 30; the numbers after the ED represent the amount
of trials before the presentation of descriptions). In the ED condi-
tions, participants first went through a number of trials without any
descriptions: In condition ED20, participants went through 20 trials
without descriptions, with descriptions appearing from trial
21 onward; in ED40, descriptions were shown from trial 41 onward,
and so forth. After appearing, descriptions remained present until
the end of the task (Figure 1).
2.1.3 | Task
The task was based on the traditional IGT, with the addition of
descriptions (DIGT; Weiss-Cohen et al., 2018). The original IGT out-
come schedule was used, although without a predetermined fixed
order as in the original task (Bechara et al., 1994, Figure 1). Instead,
we used a pseudo-randomization approach in blocks of 20 trials each,
ensuring that the correct proportion of cards was respected but in a
randomized order in each block (Camilleri & Newell, 2011a; Weiss-
Cohen et al., 2018). Participants could select from four decks of cards:
two advantageous and two disadvantageous, in terms of their overall
expected returns. The disadvantageous decks, traditionally labelled A
and B in the IGT literature, provide higher short-term gains of
100 points for most of the cards, but overall negative long-term
expected values of –25 points each, due to some cards providing
some very large losses (–1,150 points in some cases). The two advan-
tageous decks, traditionally labelled C and D, provide smaller short-
term gains of 50 points for most of the cards, and because they do
not have the same large losses (the largest loss is –200 points), they
return an overall positive long-term expected value of 25 points each.
The actual schedule of outcomes can be seen in the descriptions in
Figure 1b. Feedback was provided as net outcomes, unlike the IGT
where gains and losses were presented separately.
The four decks of cards were shown face down side by side, and
their positioning on screen was randomized. The patterns seen on the
backs of the decks were also randomly assigned. Partial-feedback was
given after each trial, with only the outcome of the chosen option
being revealed. The between-subjects conditions determined the
presence and timing of the descriptions displayed underneath the
decks on screen. As in the original IGT, participants started with 2000
points, with each card revealed adding or deducting points from the
running total. Points were converted into a monetary bonus at a rate
of US$0.10 per 1,000 points, and the running total in both points and
money was always displayed at the bottom of the screen. The task
was self-paced over 100 trials and was completed on average in
8.8 min (SD = 4.2).
3All raw data and R analyses scripts from the three experiments can be found on-line at
https://osf.io/khyeq/.
4We also ran all the analyses after excluding the participants who reached negative
accumulated points before the presentation of descriptions. The same patterns of results are
found and the same conclusions are reached across all three experiments.
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2.2 | Results
We analyzed selections from advantageous decks, defined as the
number of cards selected from decks C and D for each block of 20 tri-
als: This is a measure of task performance, with higher selections
resulting from individuals being able to identify the advantageous
decks (Steingroever et al., 2013). Two separate analyses were con-
ducted: first, a comparison across all trials, to verify that the previous
findings from Barron et al. (2008) and Weiss-Cohen et al. (2016,
2018) were replicated and that descriptions influenced behavior, by
informing participants of risks and reducing selections from the riskier
options; and second, an analysis measuring the magnitude of the
impact of descriptions on behavior, by comparing selections of advan-
tageous decks in the blocks of 20 trials immediately before and after
descriptions appeared.
2.2.1 | All trials
The analysis across the entire task aimed to verify the overall
influence of descriptions on choice behavior. We used a generalized
linear mixed-effects binomial model with a logit link function, ana-
lyzed with Type-II ANOVAs, with Tukey-adjusted post-hoc compari-
sons. The fixed effects were the amount of prior experience, as
measured by the timing of appearance of descriptions (DE, ED20,
ED40, ED60, ED80, E), and blocks of 20 trials. The model also
contained a random intercept for each participant and a random
slope for blocks (Figure 2a).
As can be seen in the overlapping ED lines in Figure 2a, when
comparing only the ED conditions, we found no difference in average
selections from advantageous decks between the four individual ED
conditions (ED20 vs. ED40 vs. ED60 vs. ED80: χ2(3)=3.15, p=.37).
F IGURE 1 Screenshots of Experiment 1 in ED20 condition. (a) At trial 1, before descriptions appeared. (b) At trial 21, descriptions first
appeared, and remained on screen until the end of the task. The positioning of the decks was randomized, shown here from left to right are
decks B, A, D, and C (these letters are consistent with the traditional labeling of IGT decks). HIT is an acronym within Amazon Mechanical Turk
for Human IntelligenceTask [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 Results from Experiment 1: (a) Evolution of selections from advantageous decks for each block of 20 trials by condition; (b) log
odds-ratios (logOR) of the impact of descriptions on change in selections from advantageous decks for each condition (after/before). The number
after the ED is the trial in which descriptions were first revealed to participants. The error bars represent the standard errors of the mean [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Therefore, we grouped the four ED conditions together as EDall. We
subsequently compared E, DE, and EDall. The timing of appearance of
descriptions significantly influenced task performance (E vs. DE
vs. EDall: χ
2(2) = 45.67, p < .001). A post hoc analysis showed a
significant difference between the DE and E conditions (DE=89.8%,
E=68.3%, z=3.94, p=.001), replicating the results in Weiss-Cohen et al.
(2018), where participants performed better when provided with
descriptions from the beginning of the task. There was also a signifi-
cant difference between the aggregated EDall and the DE conditions
(EDall = 63.6%, z = 5.00, p < .001), replicating the results in Barron et al.
(2008), where descriptions presented from the beginning of the task
led to better task performance than descriptions presented later in the
task. There was no difference between the E and EDall condition
(z = 0.68, p = .78), likely indicating that late presentations of descrip-
tions led to similar overall task performance as no descriptions at all.
This effect is confounded by the fact that in some of those ED condi-
tions participants did not have access to descriptions for the majority
of the duration of the task, therefore making a substantial part of the
ED and E conditions similar. The effect of block was significant
(χ2(1) = 75.12, p < .001) with a positive coefficient (b = 0.44, SE = 0.14,
z = 3.13, p = .002), indicating that participants selected more advanta-
geous decks as the task progressed. The interaction between trial and
timing of descriptions was not significant (χ2(2) = 0.06, p = .97).
2.2.2 | Impact of descriptions
We focused next on the impact of descriptions, that is, the change
in selections from advantageous decks, comparing the blocks of
20 trials immediately before and after descriptions appeared. For
example, in condition ED60, the behavioral impact of descriptions
was calculated by comparing behavior in trials 41–60, the block of
trials immediately preceding the appearance of descriptions, against
trials 61–80, after descriptions appeared. A generalized linear
mixed-effects binomial model with a logit link function was used.
The fixed effects were the amount of prior experience, as measured
by the timing of appearance of descriptions (ED20, ED40, ED60,
and ED80, representing prior experience of 20, 40, 60, and 80 trials
respectively),5 with polynomial coding (i.e., linear, quadratic and
cubic contrasts), and a binary factor identifying the presence of
descriptions (i.e., identifying if selections were made either before or
after descriptions appeared). The model also contained a random
intercept for each participant.
Overall, there was a significant effect of the presence of descrip-
tions (χ2(1) = 36.32, p < .001), with participants selecting more often
from the advantageous decks after descriptions were displayed
(Before = 53.4%, After = 62.2%, logOR = 0.36, SE = 0.06, z = 5.67,
p < .001). The log-odds-ratio represents the change in the frequency
of selections of the advantageous decks from before to after the
descriptions first appeared: Positive values indicate an increase in
selections of advantageous decks. The focus of this analysis was the
interaction between the amount of prior experience (based on the
timing of descriptions) and the presence of descriptions (before
vs. after), which returned a significant effect (χ2(3) = 45.11, p < .001).
The linear contrast was negative and significant (b = −0.57, SE = 0.13,
z = 4.40, p < .001), indicating that increases in the amount of prior
experience (i.e., delaying descriptions) reduced the impact of descrip-
tions (Figure 2b). The quadratic contrast was not significant
(b = −0.03, SE = 0.13, z = 0.02, p = .98), whereas the cubic contrast
was negative and significant (b = −0.65, SE = 0.13, z = 5.11, p < .001).
There was also an overall main significant effect of the amount of
prior experience (χ2(3) = 7.88, p = .049). As the task progressed, par-
ticipants selected on average more often from the advantageous
decks, regardless of the presence of descriptions.
2.3 | Discussion
The results of this experiment confirmed our hypothesis that
increased prior experience leads to reductions in the influence of
descriptive information on choice behavior. When comparing the
different ED conditions against the selections from advantageous
decks observed before and after the appearance of descriptions, the
hypothesis that more experience leads to a lower impact of descrip-
tions was confirmed. The impact of descriptions was lower for par-
ticipants who were presented with descriptions later in the task and
therefore had more time to accumulate larger amounts of prior
experience. Based on theories of reinforcement learning, such
behavior (i.e., discounting of information received later in the task)
can be explained by learning rates which reduce over time. Descrip-
tive information that is presented early in the task is integrated at
higher rates as a result of early high learning rates and influence
behavior more. Later presentation of descriptive information, when
learning rates are lower, is greatly discounted, and does not influ-
ence behavior as strongly.
Very late appearance of descriptions, at trial 80, was even delete-
rious to task performance, leading to a lower selection of advanta-
geous decks (Figure 2b). This is a perverse influence of descriptions,
resulting in a deterioration of task performance from the presentation
of descriptive information. Similar results have been observed in previ-
ous research, with warning messages increasing risk-taking behavior
in certain situations: the opposite of the desired effect of such warn-
ings (Ben-Ari et al., 1999; Ferraro et al., 2005; Hansen et al., 2010). It
is also possible that descriptions reminded participants of the higher
winnings associated with the high-risk alternatives, which on average
participants would be selecting less often towards the end of the task
(Ginley et al., 2016).
There was no observable difference in average behavior across all
trials between participants in the E condition and participants in the
ED conditions. This highlights the importance of early presentation of
descriptions to ensure their maximum influence, before any prior
experience. Participants performed significantly better when descrip-
tions were shown before any experience (DE), choosing the
5The other two conditions, E and DE were not included in the analysis because they did not
include a transition from no-description to description: They were either never present, or
always present, respectively.
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advantageous decks more frequently throughout, in comparison to all
other conditions. It appears that presentation of descriptions before
any prior experience is an important moderator of the influence of
descriptions in selection rates observed in this task, to ensure maxi-
mum behavioral impact (see Miron-Shatz et al., 2010).
Experiment 1 also replicated previous research showing that
descriptions influence behavior and help improve performance in
complex tasks. In a complex task such as the IGT, which demands
excessive cognitive effort to learn by experience alone (Stocco
et al., 2009), descriptions are taken into consideration and inte-
grated into the decision-making process, helping identify the advan-
tageous decks (see Weiss-Cohen et al., 2018). Participants in the
conditions with descriptions performed better on the task than par-
ticipants in the condition with no descriptions. The findings from
Barron et al. (2008), who showed that participants who had access
to descriptions prior to any experience performed better than par-
ticipants who received descriptions halfway through the task, were
also replicated here with the significant difference between the DE
and ED conditions.
The current findings might be obscured by the influence of
learning effects. In this experiment, the information provided by
descriptions matched the experiential feedback; thus, after increased
exposure with the task (and learning of the advantageous strategy,
e.g., in ED60 and ED80 conditions),6 the appearance of descriptions
did not add anything new to participants' knowledge. Consequently,
the influence of additional information provided when the environ-
ment had been well-learned would be minimal. Previously, we
showed that descriptions influence behavior more when they pre-
sent individuals with novel information (Weiss-Cohen et al., 2016,
2018). In the next experiment, we employ a task in which descrip-
tions always provide novel information which cannot be learned by
experience alone.
3 | EXPERIMENT 2
To ensure that descriptions always provided novel information, the
second experiment was designed to be a task which could not be
learned via experience alone. This was accomplished by introducing
low-probability (rare) outcomes, which never occurred (i.e., not experi-
enced by participants) before descriptions first appeared. When
descriptions were shown to participants, they contained information
about all possible outcomes, including these rare events that had
never been observed experientially before and thus provided useful
novel information. The outcome schedule in Experiment 2 closely
followed the nature of the original IGT: Decks A and B provided fre-
quent larger positive rewards of 250 points but rare large losses;
whereas decks C and D provided frequent smaller positive rewards of
100 points and no rare large losses.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
We recruited 135 participants (75 females; age: M = 35.2 years) online
using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service. Participation was restricted
to individuals whose location was defined as in the United States. No
participants were excluded. Participants were paid a fixed amount of
US$0.25 for participating and an additional bonus according to the
outcomes of the choices they made during the experiment (Bonus:
M = US$0.44, SD = US$0.41, range = [US$0.00, US$1.80]). As
before, only positive bonuses were paid: 37 participants ended
the task with negative bonuses which were not deducted from their
final compensation.
3.1.2 | Design
Experiment 2 was a between-subjects design with four conditions,
manipulating the amount of prior experience before descriptions were
presented to participants as in Experiment 1: ED20, ED40, ED60, and
ED80, with the numbers after the ED representing the total number
of trials before descriptions were first shown (N for each condition:
ED20=35, ED40=34, ED60=33, ED80=33). Crucially, the descriptions
warned participants of high-magnitude low-probability outcomes that
only occurred in the last 20 trials of the task (trials 101-120) and
therefore always provided novel information, because these rare
events never occurred before the descriptions appeared. This
approach also allowed for a “clean” block of 20 trials in every experi-
mental condition, without any rare events, before and after descrip-
tions appeared.
3.1.3 | Task
The task was self-paced, lasted 120 trials, and was completed on aver-
age in 9.22 min (SD = 3.56). Participants started the task with 5,000
points,7 and points were converted into money at a rate of US$0.10
per 1,000 points. In order to ensure that the descriptions provided
novel information, all the low-probability (rare) events occurred in the
last 20 trials of the task. In the first 100 trials, all decks had an EV of
zero; decks could be categorized as advantageous or disadvantageous
based on the rare events occurring in the last 20 trials. Decks A and B
were the high-risk options, because they were associated with large
losses in the last 20 trials; and decks C and D were the low-risk
options, because they did not produce any large losses in the last
20 trials (seeTable 1).
The purpose of keeping the EV equal to zero up to trial
100 was to ensure that participants did not create a preference
6Bechara et al. (1997) and Maia and McClelland (2005) report that by trial 50 in the IGT
(i.e., halfway through the task) most participants already have a good conscious knowledge of
the advantageous strategy (see also Konstantinidis & Shanks, 2014).
7The larger number of starting points in comparison to Experiment 1 was to allow for the
zero-EV nature of the task in the first 100 trials. As participants did not accumulate as many
points during the task, the initial amount had to be increased to ensure an appropriate level
of reward at the end of the task.
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towards any of the decks via experience alone, before descriptions
appeared, which should produce almost similar choice rates between
decks. However, it could be the case that participants would show
a small preference towards the high-risk decks initially, as these
decks produce larger frequent wins of +250 points compared to the
smaller frequent wins of only +100 points in the low-risk decks.
This conflict between wins and losses is similar to the one in the
traditional IGT, which leads to an observed preference towards the
decks with higher frequent wins. When all trials are taken into
account, the descriptions are representative of the cards contained
within each deck, although not exactly matched, due to the round-
ing of the probabilities. However, prior to trial 100, the descriptions
contradicted the experience. Contrary to Experiment 1, the descrip-
tions always provided novel information to participants, because
they included the rare events, which never appeared before the
descriptions were shown.
For example, according to the descriptions in deck A, across all
120 trials, participants would observe two cards with −5,250 points
(1.7% of the total number of trials, the descriptions were rounded
for ease of understanding). These cards never appeared in the first
100 trials, but instead all of these high-magnitude low-probability
loss cards appeared in the last 20 trials, thus completing the overall
distribution of cards. In the case of deck A, this was done by
replacing the −2,250 points cards in the last block with cards pro-
ducing losses of −5250 points, and similarly for the other decks.
Table 1 details the actual experienced outcomes for each deck in
the first 100 and last 20 trials, as well as the actual descriptions
used for each deck. The order of the cards were randomized within
each block of 20 trials. As in Experiment 1, the descriptions
appeared at different points during the task, according to the exper-
imental condition.
3.2 | Results
The impact of descriptions on selections from low-risk decks
was analyzed with the same mixed-effects model as in Experiment
1, with two fixed effects: amount of prior experience (ED20,
ED40, ED60, and ED80) and presence of descriptions (before
vs. after).
The impact of descriptions on behavior can be seen in
Figure 3a, with an increase in selections from the low-risk decks in
the block after descriptions were first shown, with the largest
impact on condition ED20 (early presentation of descriptions).
Figure 3a also suggests that, despite all decks having an EV of zero,
participants did indeed show a small preference for the high-risk
decks before descriptions appeared, likely attracted by their larger
frequent wins.
The interaction between amount of prior experience and pres-
ence of descriptions was significant (χ2(3) = 30.36, p < .001). The lin-
ear contrast for that interaction was significant with a negative slope
(b = −0.62, SE = 0.12, z = 5.15, p < .001). This negative relationship
indicates that with higher levels of prior experience, descriptions had
a reduced impact on behavior (Figure 3b). The quadratic and cubic
contrasts were not significant (Quadratic: b = 0.21, SE = 0.12, z = 1.74,
p =.08; Cubic: b = −0.07, SE = 0.12, z = 0.55, p = .58).
The main effect of the presence of descriptions, irrespective of
when descriptions first appeared, was also significant (χ2(1) = 64.24,
p < .001), with an increase in the selections from low-risk decks after
descriptions appeared (Before=38.4%, After=50.0%, logOR=0.48,
SE=0.06, z=7.96, p<.001). Differently from Experiment 1, the main
effect of amount of prior experience was not significant (χ2(3) = 5.06,
p = .17). There was no difference in overall selections according to
prior experience.
TABLE 1 Deck composition and wording of descriptions shown underneath each deck in Experiment 2
Actual experienced outcomes
First 5 blocks of 20 trials each:
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
18 cards: +250 pts 16 cards: +250 pts 18 cards: +100 pts 16 cards: +100 pts
2 cards: −2,250 pts 4 cards: −1,000 pts 2 cards: −900 pts 4 cards: −400 pts
Last block of 20 trials:
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
18 of cards: +250 pts 15 cards: +250 pts 18 cards: +100 pts 15 cards: +100 pts
2 of cards: −5,250pts 5 cards: −2500pts 2 cards: +350 pts 5 cards: +225 pts
Description labels shown underneath each deck after trial n in condition EDn
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
90% of cards: +250 pts 80% of cards: +250 pts 90% of cards: +100 pts 80% of cards: +100 pts
8% of cards: −2,250 pts 16% of cards: −1,000 pts 8% of cards: −900 pts 16% of cards: −400 pts
2% of cards: −5,250pts 4% of cards: −2,500pts 2% of cards: +350 pts 4% of cards: +225 pts
Note. Probabilities were rounded. The descriptions were representative of the outcomes across all trials, however the rare events only occurred in the last
20 trials. The expected value for each individual deck in the first 100 trials (excluding the rare events) was zero for all decks. However, when taking into
account the rare events presented in the last 20 trials (i.e., across all 120 trials of the task), the described EV in decks a and b were −60 points, and in decks
c and d, they were +25 points.
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3.3 | Discussion
The presence of descriptions in Experiment 2 influenced behavior in
the predicted direction, replicating the findings in Experiment 1. The
appearance of descriptions helped participants identify and select the
low-risk decks more often, therefore avoiding the large losses associ-
ated with the high-risk decks. The reduction in selections from high-
risk decks associated with the appearance of warning descriptions
was moderated by the amount of prior experience, with larger reduc-
tions for participants with less prior experience. This adds further cre-
dence to our initial hypothesis that the amount of prior experience
moderates the way that descriptive information is integrated into the
decision making process.
In Experiment 1, this negative relationship between amount of
experience and influence of descriptions could have been the result of
incremental learning via experience over time, with descriptions not
providing any novel useful information. This potentially confounding
effect was eliminated in the current experiment, in which the descrip-
tions always provided novel useful information that could not have
been learned experientially. For the disadvantageous high-risk decks,
the descriptive information acted as a warning against high-magnitude
low-probability losses that never occurred before the descriptions
appeared. Similarly for the advantageous low-risk decks, it provided
information about rare treasures.
The observed pattern of the impact of descriptions might be the
result of the hot stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001). Although the
research on the hot stove effect deals with the influence of direct
negative experiences, it is possible that the actual experience of bad
outcomes is not needed, only its possibility (see also “mere presenta-
tion effect,” Erev et al., 2008). Consequently, in D+E tasks, the
descriptions might be acting as hot stoves, causing the options with
bad outcomes to be avoided regardless of whether any bad outcomes
have actually been experienced. Therefore, when a participant is pres-
ented with descriptions, they may act as if “burned” by the possibility
of high losses with the high-risk decks and select them less frequently.
This lower frequency of selections amplify the effect of the descrip-
tions, by not giving participants the opportunity to realize that in fact
the high losses presented do not occur as frequently as expected, and
until much later in the task. This can occur even when descriptions
are true representations of the experience (as the ones used here),
which should still create a mismatch between described and experi-
enced outcomes: The expectation of individuals is generated from
descriptions, in which rare events are overweighted; whereas the per-
ception of individuals will be based on their experience, in which rare
events are underweighted (Hertwig et al., 2004).
The hot stove effect however only presents itself in tasks with
partial-feedback, as full-feedback will give participants the opportu-
nity to gather information from the avoided options, correcting any
potential biases. The possibility that the hot-stove effect can be a
moderating factor is tested in the next experiment where full feed-
back is provided.
4 | EXPERIMENT 3
Although in Experiments 1 and 2 we employed partial-feedback,
Experiment 3 introduced full-feedback, in order to explore if the influ-
ence of descriptions was a result of the hot stove effect. Although in
paradigms with partial-feedback, participants are only shown out-
comes for their selected options, in paradigms with full-feedback, out-
come feedback is provided for all available options (i.e., including
foregone payoffs).
Behavior in the same task (i.e., choice options with same charac-
teristics) with partial-feedback and full-feedback can differ in predict-
able ways. The hot stove effect is only relevant in the context of tasks
with partial-feedback, but not when full-feedback is provided
(Camilleri & Newell, 2011b; Luria et al., 2017; Plonsky & Erev, 2017).
This is because the impairment of learning caused by the hot stove
F IGURE 3 Results from Experiment 2: (a) Evolution of selections from low-risk decks for each block of 20 trials by condition; (b) log odds-
ratios (logOR) of the impact of descriptions on change in selections from low-risk decks for each condition (after/before). The number after the
ED is the trial in which descriptions were first revealed to participants. The error bars represent the standard errors of the mean [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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effect can only occur with partial-feedback: with full-feedback, indi-
viduals still have the opportunity to gather information about the
options with bad outcomes that are no longer being selected. The hot
stove effect bias is corrected by foregone payoffs, and the avoidance
of options following bad outcomes is not sustained over long periods
(but not completely eliminated, see also Worthy et al., 2013).
With the hot stove effect not taking hold in tasks with full-feed-
back, risk-taking is higher, leading to more risky choices overall
(Grosskopf et al., 2006; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005, 2006). This is
because the risky options are typically the ones with higher variance
and more extreme outcomes: risky options tend to be the ones with
the bad outcomes which will trigger the hot stove effect. The hot
stove effect can artificially reduce the attractiveness of risky options
in partial-feedback paradigms, whereas with full-feedback this bias is
curtailed and the attractiveness of risky options is no longer artificially
reduced. Therefore, the hot stove effect is associated with avoidance
of high-risk options (Biele et al., 2009).
If the hot stove effect is behind the behavioral patterns observed
from the delayed introduction of descriptions in the first two experi-
ments, then we will observe a different pattern of behavior with full-
feedback. Participants will still be able to observe foregone feedback,
and they might be attracted to select the high-risk decks (due to
attractive wins occurring from selecting these decks) despite descrip-
tions discouraging them from doing so. This should reduce the impact
of the rare negative outcomes present in the descriptions. One poten-
tial hypothesis is that participants should select more often from the
high-risk decks throughout the task, and the shift from the high-risk
to low-risk decks after the appearance of descriptions should no lon-
ger be largest for earlier presentation of descriptions.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
We recruited 140 participants (49 females; age: M = 34.2 years) online
using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service. Participation was restricted
to individuals whose location was defined as in the United States. No
participants were excluded. Participants were paid a fixed amount of
US$0.25 for participating and an additional bonus according to the
outcomes of the choices they made during the experiment (Bonus:
M = US$0.31, SD = US$0.36, range = [US$0.00, US$1.40]). As before,
only positive bonuses were paid: 55 participants ended the task with
negative bonuses which were not deducted from their final compen-
sation, considerably more than in the previous experiments, which
were the result of increased risk-taking (i.e., selections from the high-
risk decks).
4.1.2 | Design
Experiment 3 used the same paradigm as Experiment 2, with four
between-subjects conditions, manipulating the amount of prior expe-
rience when descriptions were presented to participants: ED20,
ED40, ED60, and ED80, with the numbers after the ED representing
the total number of trials before descriptions were first shown (N for
each condition: ED20=35, ED40=36, ED60=36, ED80=33).
4.1.3 | Task
The task in Experiment 3 was the same as in Experiment 2, lasting
120 trials and was completed on average in 11.7 min (SD=5.6). The
only alteration was the introduction of full-feedback: After each selec-
tion, feedback was presented for all four decks.
4.2 | Results
The impact of descriptions on selections from low-risk decks was ana-
lyzed with the same mixed-effects model as in Experiments 1 and
2, with two fixed effects: amount of prior experience (ED20, ED40,
ED60, and ED80) and presence of descriptions (before vs. after).
We observed much higher rates of risk-taking behavior with full-
feedback in Experiment 3 than with partial-feedback in Experiment
2, with lower selections from the low-risk decks throughout the task,
as shown in Figure 4a. This is consistent with behavior in similar tasks
with full-feedback (e.g.,Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005, 2006).
The impact of descriptions on behavior was the opposite of what
was observed in the previous experiments (with partial-feedback), as
shown in Figure 4b. There was still an increase in selections from the
low-risk decks in the block after descriptions were first shown, but
the largest increase was now in the ED80 condition (late presentation
of descriptions). The interaction between amount of prior experience
and presence of descriptions was significant (χ2(3) = 15.13, p = .002),
although the linear contrast for the interaction was significant with a
positive slope (b=0.49, SE=0.13, z=3.67, p<.001). This indicates that
with higher levels of prior experience, descriptions had a higher
impact on behavior. The quadratic and cubic contrasts were not sig-
nificant (Quadratic: b=−0.12, SE=0.13, z=0.93, p=.35; Cubic: b=0.13,
SE=0.13, z=1.05, p=.29).
The main effect of the presence of descriptions, irrespective of
when descriptions first appeared, was also significant (χ2(1) = 20.59,
p < .001), with an increase in the selection from low-risk decks after
descriptions appeared (Before=23.0%, After=28.5%, logOR=0.29,
SE=0.07, z=4.45, p<.001). However, across all conditions, the impact
of descriptions was lower than in Experiment 2, with a lower log-
odds-ratio, with translates into a lower increase in selection from low-
risk decks due to descriptions in Experiment 1 than in Experiment
2. Similar to Experiment 2, the main effect of amount of prior experi-
ence was not significant (χ2(3) = 5.67, p = .13). There was no differ-
ence in overall selections according to prior experience.
4.3 | Discussion
In Experiment 3, the influence of prior experience on the impact of
descriptions did not follow the expected pattern as hypothesized in
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the introduction, and as observed in the previous experiments.
Instead, with full-feedback, we observed a behavioral pattern that
was opposite to the one obtained with partial-feedback: When partic-
ipants have access to complete feedback, the warning descriptions
have a reduced impact when received earlier (with no prior experi-
ence), and an increased impact when received later (with more prior
experience).8 As the hot stove effect is bypassed with the introduc-
tion of full-feedback, the observed difference in behavior between
full-feedback and partial-feedback confirms that the hot stove effect
was at least partially responsible for the behavior observed in the pre-
vious experiments. The hot stove effect was circumvented because
full-feedback provides participants with the information required to
correct for any biases created by the avoidance of options because of
early bad outcomes (or in the case of our experiment, the negative
information provided by the descriptions). With the elimination of the
hot stove effect, we believe there are two main possible accounts for
the mechanisms behind the reversed behavioral pattern in Experiment
3: one based on attention and one based on regret, both of which are
associated with foregone payoffs.
4.3.1 | Attention
As observed by the lower odds-ratios in Experiment 3, across all
experimental conditions, descriptions influenced behavior less when
there was full-feedback, when compared to Experiments 1 and 2. One
way in which this can be explained is by looking at how attention, a
limited cognitive resource, is allocated. Full-feedback increases cogni-
tive and attentional demand on the task, with considerably more
information presented after each trial: in addition to a single obtained
payoff, individuals also had to attend to three foregone payoffs after
each trial (Ashby & Rakow, 2016). As shown by Weiss-Cohen et al.
(2018), descriptions do not influence behavior in tasks of high com-
plexity, likely because individuals lack the attentional and cognitive
bandwidth required to process them. Descriptions are more cogni-
tively demanding than experience; therefore, it is expected that a
preference is given to experience when cognitive load is higher
(Lejarraga, 2010).
As individuals accumulate experience and develop a better under-
standing of the choice environment, their attention to feedback infor-
mation reduces: this strategy is adapted to static environments, in
which feedback become less informative, and therefore less impor-
tant, with time (Ashby & Rakow, 2016; Grosskopf et al., 2006). This
shift in attention can free cognitive resources to deal with other infor-
mation, such as descriptions: therefore, later presented descriptions
can have greater impact as they benefit from the lower attention
given to feedback.
4.3.2 | Regret
The literature on decision affect theory indicates that choices are
guided by emotions resulting from negative outcomes, such as regret
and disappointment, both of which can be anticipated (pre-decisional)
or experienced (post-decisional; Mellers et al., 1999). Disappointment
can occur in partial-feedback environments, if the obtained outcome
is worse than expected; whereas regret can only occur with full-feed-
back, when the outcome of the foregone option is better than that of
the chosen option (Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg, 1999). Experi-
enced emotions are associated with feedback; whereas the addition
of descriptions introduces anticipated emotions. The higher risk-taking
commonly observed in full-feedback tasks has been associated with
regret avoidance (Reb & Connolly, 2009; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997;
8To ensure that this observed reversal of behavioral pattern was not a false positive, we ran a
post-hoc power analysis using simulations. The analysis showed that the observed power of
the positive linear slope for the interaction between amount of prior experience and
presence of descriptions in Experiment 3 was high, at 94.5% (95% C.I. = [92.9%, 95.8%]). The
other two studies were equally well-powered.
F IGURE 4 Results from Experiment 3: (a) Evolution of selections from low-risk decks for each block of 20 trials by condition; (b) log odds-
ratios (logOR) of the impact of descriptions on change in selections from low-risk decks for each condition (after/before). The number after the
ED is the trial in which descriptions were first revealed to participants. The error bars represent the standard errors of the mean [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Zeelenberg et al., 1996). More recently, by selectively manipulating
exposure to foregone feedback, Plonsky and Teodorescu (2020) have
experimentally confirmed that higher regret leads to higher risk-taking,
even when participants have access to full descriptive information.
In Experiment 3, with full-feedback, we propose that descriptions
triggered anticipated regret: individuals wanted to avoid the regret
associated with experiencing a large loss (after choosing a high-risk
deck), while foregoing the small frequent gain from an unchosen low-
risk deck.9 This regret avoidance behavior, however, increases with
experience. Cooke et al. (2001) suggest that individuals learn to antici-
pate and avoid regret over time, and adjust their future behavior to
avoid repeated regret: more than one initial occasion of a regretful
loss is needed (Ratner & Herbst, 2005). This idea of learned regret has
been confirmed by neuroimaging research, which has shown that indi-
viduals become increasingly regret aversive over time, with an appar-
ent cumulative effect of the experience of regret: participants'
anticipated regret increased with experience (Coricelli, Critchley et al.,
2005; Coricelli, Dolan et al., 2007). This accumulation and learning to
react to anticipated regret can help explain why later descriptions
were more influential than earlier ones in Experiment 3: higher antici-
pated regret triggered by later descriptions made participants shift
more, whereas in early trials anticipated regret was low and not
enough to make participants shift away from the high-risk decks.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The objective of the current work was to assess whether and how the
accumulation of prior experience shapes the impact of descriptive
information in decisions from description-plus-experience. Across
three experiments, we found that the amount of prior experience
moderates the influence of descriptions. The direction of this relation-
ship was dependent on the amount of information provided at feed-
back: partial or full. In Experiments 1 and 2, with partial-feedback,
there was a negative relationship between the amount of prior experi-
ence and the impact of descriptions on choice behavior: Descriptions
influenced behavior more when participants had not accumulated
prior experience; in such situations of reduced accumulation of
experience with the task, choice behavior was more susceptible to
influences caused by the descriptive information. In the conditions
in which descriptions appeared in later stages of the task (as indexed
by the amount of purely experiential trials), descriptions had a
lower impact, with participants shifting less towards behavior
predicted by descriptions. However, these patterns were reversed in
Experiment 3, with full-feedback: when more information was
provided after every trial, later descriptions influenced behavior more
than earlier descriptions.
5.1 | Potential mechanisms
The behavioral patterns observed here can be explained by a bidirec-
tional interaction between descriptive and experiential information
and how this interaction influences the learning process: Prior experi-
ence can influence how future descriptions are integrated into the
decision-making process; and, conversely, prior descriptions can influ-
ence how future experience is learned. Theories of reinforcement
learning already include the idea that previously acquired knowledge
interferes with the learning of new information (Wisniewski, 1995;
Wisniewski & Medin, 1991). More recently, Hertwig et al. (2018)
suggested that there should be influences on learning from both
description and experience, which are two different but interacting
ways of learning about the choice environment (Wulff et al., 2017).
5.1.1 | Prior experience influences how descriptive
information is integrated
Theories of reinforcement learning show that prior knowledge can
influence future learning, by encouraging the dismissal of information
supporting new alternative hypotheses when they go against more
established ones (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994): Old hypotheses will
persevere even in the face of new information (Darby & Sloutsky,
2015; Lin & Murphy, 1997). With the accumulation of experience, the
learning process can be attenuated and slowed down (Einstein, 1976),
with new information being discounted, distorted, and at the extreme,
even completely ignored. Confirmation bias is a related phenomenon
that also leads to informational neglect and distorted learning: Individ-
uals attend mostly to new information that confirms their previously
established beliefs and ignore those that go against it (Klayman & Ha,
1987; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Pilditch & Custers, 2018). This
behavior supports the idea that individuals seek to avoid cognitive dis-
sonance (Anderson, 2003): “an individual tends to discard or mentally
suppress information that indicates a past decision was in error”
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988, p.39). Thus, the interference pro-
vided by prior experience can lead to a dampening of the influence of
later information. Therefore, it is plausible that the more experiential
information an individual has accumulated, the better established are
their hypotheses about the environment, which will be more resistant
to future contradictory information such as descriptive warnings
about rare events.
5.1.2 | Descriptions influence how experiential
information is integrated
The presence of descriptions can also bias the accumulation of experi-
ence and its associated learning. We believe that, in partial-feedback
tasks, descriptions might be triggering the hot stove effect, with par-
ticipants being vicariously “burned” by the bad outcomes presented in
the descriptions. The hot stove effect severely constrains the learning
process by reducing the likelihood of selections from undesirable
options, after a sequence of bad outcomes; in partial-feedback
9Participants could also experience regret from the lower positive outcomes of the low-risk
decks, in comparison to the larger positive outcomes of the high-risk decks. We believe that
this comparison is not as strong as the regret associated with the losses. First, the
magnitudes of gains are lower: the large losses of the high-risk decks are likely to generate
considerably more regret. Second, regret with regards to larger losses is stronger than those
with regards to smaller wins (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
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environments, there are no opportunities for further learning from
unselected options, therefore eliminating learning about how
unnattractive these options really are (i.e., how often the stove is hot;
Denrell & March, 2001). This process is likely to be related to the
overweighting of rare events observed in decisions from descriptions,
which would dictate that even though the described bad outcomes
only occur rarely, individuals perceive them as happening much more
often (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In contrast, in full-feedback para-
digms, the hot stove effect is not sustained because individuals are
able to learn from the foregone outcomes and therefore realize that
the stove is not necessarily “hot” all the time. Eliminating the hot
stove effect via full-feedback in our experiment was detrimental to
performance, leading to more risk-taking, lower bonuses, and reduced
impact of the descriptions, which acted as warning messages.
Although the hot stove effect is typically perceived as a negative bias
(as it stops individuals from correcting biases introduced by early bad
outcomes), in the case of warning messages, it is a welcome way of
helping reduce risk-taking behavior.
5.1.3 | Influence of foregone payoffs
The introduction of foregone payoffs (full-feedback) eliminated the
hot stove effect and helped identify it as one of the mechanisms
behind the relationship between descriptions and experience. How-
ever, full-feedback also reversed the behavioral pattern from what
was originally proposed under partial-feedback, raising new questions
about how experiential and descriptive information interact. Across
decision-making paradigms, the introduction of foregone payoffs has
frequently changed behavioral patterns substantially (e.g., Denrell,
2007; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006; Yechiam & Rakow, 2012). We
proposed two different accounts for the observed pattern reversal,
both of which are associated with the availability of foregone payoffs.
First, attentional resources are under more demand in full-feedback
paradigms. We proposed that experience gets attentional priority, and
when experience requires too much demand, such as in full-feedback
paradigms, then descriptions are not attended to. Therefore, it is only
later in the task, after the attentional demands of feedback have
reduced, that descriptions receive enough attention to influence
behavior. Second, regret, which only occurs when foregone payoffs
are known, accumulates over time and is learned with experience. As
a result, anticipated regret increases as the task progresses. We pro-
pose that descriptions carrying negative information can trigger antici-
pated regret (with full-feedback); moreover, as prior experience is
accumulated, anticipated regret increases, and that, as a result, partici-
pants react more to those descriptions. Future research should con-
tinue exploring how negative emotions, such as regret and
disappointment, influences decisions differently under description,
experience, and description-plus-experience.
5.2 | Limitations and extensions
One limitation of the current set of experiments is that participants
might not trust the descriptive information. Specifically, after many
trials in which a particular outcome has not been observed, a descrip-
tion including this outcome might be considered as deceitful. Lack of
trust can also explain why descriptions had a lower impact on behav-
ior in Experiment 3, as the full-feedback increased the amount of
information available with which participants could dismiss the verac-
ity of the descriptions.
This is a problem with any type of description which includes rare
outcomes which are almost never observed (Weiss-Cohen et al.,
2016). The more experience an individual has with the task, the easier
it is to dismiss a description including events which rarely occur. The
lack of compliance with warnings might be fomented by the prolifera-
tion of unnecessary warnings against dangerous outcomes even if
they are extremely rare (and sometimes even impossible) to occur.
This overzealous approach to health and safety reduces the credibility
of warnings. For example, Carson and Mannering (2001) noticed that
road hazard signs warning individuals of the potential accumulation of
ice on the road can be found in roads that rarely see snow or ice. It
remains to be tested empirically if manipulating the trustworthiness,
source, and nature, of descriptions can change the results observed
here (see Pilditch et al., 2020).
Another potential limitation is that the descriptions used here
were always present on screen after initially displayed. Therefore their
impact on behavior might not be limited to the trials immediately fol-
lowing their initial appearance. In real life, it is common for warning
signs to be seen only occasionally, for example, gambling machines
employ pop-up messages which appear after a certain number of
games are played (Ginley et al., 2017), and patient information leaflets
are rarely read every time a patient takes the same medication
(although some warnings, such as those in alcohol bottles and ciga-
rette packs, are more constantly present, Rogers et al., 2000). This
permanent or intermittent exposure to warning labels is likely to inter-
act with the attention-based account for the impact of descriptions,
and further research is needed to investigate how behavior is
influenced by the removal of descriptions.
5.3 | Applications
Considering that warnings might be seen as descriptive information
about catastrophic rare events added onto an individual's own per-
sonal experience (Hertwig et al., 2018), with the aim of encouraging a
shift in behavior, our research can be useful for the creation of effec-
tive warning messages. Our findings reinforce the importance of ear-
lier warnings for influencing behavior in situations where only partial-
feedback is available. These are applicable for real world warning situ-
ations, because partial-feedback conditions are more typical in the real
world, and only rarely we receive full-feedback about our foregone
choices. We expand on the previous research by Barron et al. (2008),
who had shown that warnings presented at the beginning of the task,
before any experience, had a greater impact on behavior than descrip-
tions presented halfway through the task. We have now shown that
in addition to warnings before any prior experience, warnings post
experience are more effective when the amount of experience is
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smaller. In order to influence experience-based risky choice, it is
essential to present descriptions as early as possible. The more an
individual accumulates prior experience, the lower the behavioral
impact of any subsequent descriptive information. Therefore,
although the research by Barron et al. (2008) showed that a warning
message has to be received before any experience to have maximal
behavioral impact, we show that not all hope is lost: if prior experi-
ence is unavoidable, then, early warning messages after such experi-
ence, especially if that experience is limited, can still influence
behavior. We also show how full-feedback, in the form of observing
the potential (positive) outcomes for foregone risky options, can also
reduce the impact of descriptive warnings. In this case, it is important
to consider the attentional limitations and potential for regret in rela-
tion to the warning message.
The relationship between prior experience and descriptions can
help explain why many individuals are not responding to warnings by
scientists describing recent global warming trends. In her research on
the perception of climate change, Weber (2006) suggested that the
reason “why global warming does not scare us (yet)” is because the
scientific descriptions of global warming and the negative (disastrous)
future outcomes associated with it are being presented to a popula-
tion who so far has been spared direct personal experience of dread-
ful outcomes. Recently, we have observed how the younger
generation, who grew up with a descriptive message of global
warming from the beginning, appear to be more concerned about cli-
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APPENDIX A: DECK ANALYSIS
The traditional data-analytic approach for analyzing IGT-type tasks,
which involves combining the alternatives into a simplified “advanta-
geous” against “disadvantageous” comparison (which we also
employed in our analysis), can hide variations among the underlying
individual decks (Steingroever et al., 2013). For example, participants
tend to prefer the decks with less frequent losses, regardless of long-
term rewards (the frequency-of-losses effect; Ahn et al., 2008). Two
patterns of choice arise from this phenomenon. Participants tend to
select from deck B more frequently than expected, given it has nega-
tive EV, the highest volatility, and the largest losses (the prominent
deck B effect; Lin et al., 2007) and select from deck C less frequently
than expected, given it has positive EV, the lowest volatility, and the
smallest losses (the sunken deck C effect; Chiu & Lin, 2007). In this
appendix, we will present the results for individual decks which can
expose more specific patterns of behavior.
Experiment 1
In the experiment-only (E) condition, the patterns observed are typical
of traditional IGT tasks (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005, p. 389). We
observe that participants avoided deck A and its large and frequent
losses. We observe that participants selected more frequently from
deck B than expected. We also observe that participants did not
select as often from deck C as expected, and instead split their selec-
tions of advantageous decks between decks C and D.
With the introduction of descriptions from the beginning of the
task, in the description-experience (DE) condition, we observe a
reduction in the prominent deck B effect. A similar pattern was also
observed in the IGT with descriptions in Weiss-Cohen et al. (2018,
p. 225). It is often suggested that deck B is chosen frequently at the
start until its large losses are observed, triggering a hot stove effect
Denrell and March (2001); however, descriptions appear to help par-
ticipants avoid this deck from earlier on, which can indicate an earlier
triggering of the hot stove effect. Participants realize the attractive-
ness of deck C from the beginning of the task, likely by observing
from descriptions that it has no negative outcomes, and choose from
deck C more frequently from the start. The split between decks C and
D remain, however.
The appearance of descriptions seems to speed up learning,
accelerating the shift in the patterns observed in the E condition
(before descriptions) to the DE condition (after descriptions). We
observe an immediate reduction in selections from deck A and an
associated increase in selections from deck C. There are no clear
trends on the impact of descriptions to selections from decks B and
D. This is likely because participants are able to learn about the out-
comes of the decks from experience alone, and descriptions do not
add any novel information, after they had the opportunity to experi-
ence the outcomes via feedback. A reduction in selections from deck
B in the early ED20 condition might be a result of only a few observa-
tions of the rare large losses (which only occurs 10% of the time). An
increase in selections from deck B in later conditions ED40 and ED80
might be because the hot stove effect initially lead to an avoidance of
selections from that deck (which can led to overweighting of rare
event). The descriptions, when present, informed participants that the
bad outcomes were less often than they might have predicted.
Experiments 2 and 3
In Experiments 2 and 3, the decks are different from the traditional
IGT, so direct comparisons to Experiment 1 and prior research are not
possible. However, we can attempt to map the new decks on to those
in Experiment 1 and the traditional IGT according to their characteris-
tics. Decks A and B have negative EV with high variance whereas
decks C and D have positive EV and lower variance, similarly to Exper-
iment 1. However, in comparison to the IGT, decks A and C now have
less frequent losses (around one card in every 10), whereas decks B
and D have more frequent losses (around two losses in every ten
cards). Therefore, these decks are flipped in terms of frequency of
losses in relation to Experiment 1.10
In Experiment 2, we observe a clear preference for deck A, espe-
cially in the trials in which participants had to rely in experience alone,
before descriptions were presented. This is the deck with the less fre-
quent losses, and high recurrent wins, similar to the prominent deck B
effect observed in the IGT. The introduction of descriptions led to a
reduction in selections from the two negative-EV decks A and B, and
an associated increase in selections from the advantageous decks, C
and D. However, the shift away from deck B appears to be higher
than the shift away from deck A, even though the magnitude of losses
associated with the latter are much greater. Participants did select
more often from deck D (the deck with more frequent losses) than
deck C (which had less frequent losses). Therefore, they did not
choose the deck with less frequent losses as observed in the IGT. This
could be because the two decks had a relatively similar frequency of
losses (10% and 20%) whereas the difference between frequency of
losses of the decks in the IGT is considerably greater (10% and 50%).
In Experiment 3 with full-feedback, participants were more risk-
seeking, with considerably higher selections from deck B and, to a
lesser extent, from deck A (as this was already the preferred deck
10In addition, in Experiment 1, Deck C has no losses, only gain cards and “break even” cards
with zero value. This is not a characteristic of any deck in Experiments 2 and 3, which always
contain a combination of gain cards and loss cards.
TIMING OF DESCRIPTIONS 17
under partial-feedback, and this remained the same), together with a
reduction of selections from deck D, in comparison to partial-feed-
back. It is likely that the potential for regret from missing the
high gains of decks A and B led participants to prefer these decks
overall. This preference for the decks with higher gains (and associ-
ated higher risk-taking) is also observed in experiments which
F IGURE A1 Results for each individual deck from Experiment 1 (Iowa Gambling Task). The vertical lines represent when descriptions were
provided [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE A2 Results for each individual deck from Experiment 2 (partial-feedback) and Experiment 3 (full-feedback). The vertical lines
represent when the descriptions were unveiled [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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introduce full-feedback to the IGT (Grosskopf et al., 2006; Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005, 2006). The appearance of descriptions with full-
feedback appear to lead to a reduction in selections from deck B and
a shift towards deck D.
APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS
Reproduced below are the full set of instructions for Experiment
1, which were displayed before the task started. To ensure that partic-
ipants read the instructions, this was followed by a set of four atten-
tion checks which needed to be answered correctly before
proceeding: “How many decks of cards can you choose from?,” “How
much money can you earn in total, including the bonus?,” “How many
cards do you get to pick?,” and “What's the objective of this task?”
Experiments 2 and 3 used the same instructions with the only changes
being the bonus amounts, which are shown within brackets. HIT is an
acronym within Amazon Mechanical Turk for Human IntelligenceTask.
«Please read this instructions carefully because the amount of
money you earn in this HIT will depend on how well you perform.
Participants are paid a fixed amount of US$0.20 [US$0.25] for
completing the HIT until the end. In addition, depending on your
choices throughout the HIT, you may earn a bonus of up to US$0.55
[US$1.00], for a maximum earning potential of US$0.75 [US$1.25].
In the next screen you will see four different decks of cards side
by side, face down.
I want you to select one card at a time from any deck you choose.
Each card is associated with rewards or losses. You will find out the
cards as we go along. Each deck is formed of a different combination
of cards.
It is important to know that the colors of the cards are irrelevant
in this game and there is no way for you to figure out when you lose
money. All I can say is that no two decks are alike, and some decks are
worse than others.
You may find all of them bad, but some are worse than others.
No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win the
maximum bonus if you stay away from the worst decks.
You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at
any time, and as often as you wish.
The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, or
avoid losing money as much as possible, by getting more cards with
rewards and avoiding cards with losses.
You won't know when the game will end. You must keep playing
until it tells you to stop.
Occasionally the computer might randomly decide to give you
some hints by giving you more information about the cards contained
within each deck.
You start with 2,000 [5,000] bonus points. After each card you
select, if the card contains a reward, the amount will be added to your
total points, and if the card contains a loss, the amount will be
deducted.
At the end of the HIT, your final score will be converted to money
at a rate of $0.10 for every 1,000 points.
Choosing wisely between the decks of cards, in order to maximise
your points, will help you increase your bonus.
Please keep in mind that you need to complete the task until the
end, and click the final orange submit button, to send in your bonus
rewards back to Amazon. If you exit early or do not finish, you will not
earn any money.»
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